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In this paper, I examine the effects of tax reforms for an economy in a welfare state. I do
this by a macroeconomic model, which includes not only households, firms and a
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and entrepreneurs. The workers are employed by the firms, which are owned by the
entrepreneurs. This paper shows that decreasing labour taxation and increasing
consumption taxation would have a number of positive effects. These include increased
aggregate utility as well as increased consumption of the workers combined with increased
profits of the entrepreneurs. Also the employment rate would improve. Decreasing profit
taxation and increasing consumption taxation would also have positive effects, but only for
the entrepreneurs.
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1 List of Variables and Parameters
A production level parameter
C workers’ consumption
D government debt
E employment rate
F level of production
G public expenditures
I entrepreneurs’ investment
K entrepreneurs’ capital stock
L entrepreneurs’ labour demand
N workers’ labour supply
P price level
TLW worker’s labour tax
Tpi profit tax rate
TC consumption tax rate
UW workers’ utility
UE entrepreneurs’ utility
W workers’ wealth/savings
w gross wage rate
Y entrepreneurs’ gross income
α ratio between unemployment benefits and wage rate
1
δ depreciation rate
η income share of capital
pi entrepreneurs’ profits
ρ rate of time preference
σ factor elasticity
ψ worker’s dis-utility of working
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2 Introduction
Finland, being one of the Nordic welfare states, is generally considered as
an example of a society with high taxation. However, there are signs that
the taxation has reached such a high level that many politicians prefer not
to cross. In spite of that public expenditures tend still to rise and there is a
discussion about how to deal with the situation taking into consideration a
socially acceptable solution. One result seems to be that important sectors of
society, e.g. social security and education, suffer. Instead politicians should
be open-minded regarding other solutions. Those could involve changing the
balance between different forms of taxation. However, it could also be inter-
esting to investigate the results of smaller public expenses combined with a
lower general level of taxation. My research topic is how reforms of the tax
code, including possible changes in public expenditures, impact the welfare of
individuals in society. The welfare is measured by utility level and income.
I investigate the theoretical impacts in a steady state environment.
In the USA, one of the big tax reforms was ”The Tax Reform Act of 1986”,
approved during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The reform simplified the
system and concerned persons as well as companies.1 However, during the
years a number of amendments changed the original intentions. In 1997 dur-
ing the Bill Clinton administration, the ”Taxpayer Relief Act” was passed
and that has generally been considered to complicate the system 2. After
the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, the Republican Party has
controlled the presidency as well as the Congress. The party used in De-
cember 2017 its power to change the taxation system by approving the ”Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act” decreasing temporarily personal income tax rates and
permanently the corporate tax rate 3.
1Chamberlain, Andrew. Twenty Years Later: The Tax Reform Act of 1986. Tax
Foundation. 2006.
2Altig, David, Auerbach, Alan J., Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Smetters, Kent A. and Wal-
liser, Jan. Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States. The American
Economic Review 91, no. 3 (2001): 574-595.
3Tax Foundation. Preliminary Details and Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
2017.
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Also in Europe there have during the last decades been substantial changes
in the tax system. The Baltic countries were in 1994 and 1995 pioneers
regarding introducing different forms of so called flat tax systems 4. The
background is described for instance by Hall and Rabushka 5. The system
can simply be a flat tax for all kinds of income, personal as well as corporate,
or refined with various exemptions including deductions and income levels.
Regarding Finland one of the most interesting changes regarding the taxation
was the one lowering the corporate tax in 2014 from 24.5 to 20 percentage 6.
The literature dealing with taxation is very extensive. It includes articles
and books which concentrate on a specific form of taxation as well as those
which present a broader approach. The literature can also be categorized
based on whether the labour market is unionized or not. Also the degree of
the unionization varies. Below some of the relevant contributions are briefly
discussed. The material is ordered based on the year of publication and not
on the relevance for my research.
Altig et al. (2001) propose a dynamic macroeconomic model to simulate
the impact and efficiency of various tax regimes. The model of Altig et
al. considers households, firms and the government in an intragenerational
setup. The consequences of a proportional income tax, a proportional con-
sumption tax, flat taxes etc. are examined. In the setup there are ”winners”
and ”losers”. The conclusion is that in some cases retired people loose when
the situation of future generations is improved. In other cases middle- and
upper-income citizens will be better off and current and future poor people
will suffer. In line with the article, the big question is ”are the gains to the
winners worth the costs for the losers”.7
4European Central Bank. Economic and monetary developments. Monthly Bulletin.
2007
5Hall, R. E. and Rabushka, A. Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax. New York: McGraw
Hill, 1983.
6Veronmaksajat. Yhteiso¨verotus.
https://www.veronmaksajat.fi/luvut/Tilastot/Tuloverot/Yhteisoverotus/.
2017. Accessed: February 2018.
7Altig et al., ibid.
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Aronsson et al. (2002) propose a general equilibrium model based on the
idea that the labour unions determine about the wages. The agents in the
model are the households/labour unions, the firms and the government. The
taxes are forwarded to the households as a lump-sum transfer. It is assumed
that the size of the population does not change. The paper researches the
effects of increasing the progressivity of taxation on the main variables in
the economy. Among the conclusions of the paper are that real wages are
increased and other variables such as working time, employment, output and
consumption are decreased.8
Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2003) use a model for a small open economy. The
world market determines the prices of products. The players are the con-
sumers of two productivity types, deciding about the labour supply, the
firms deciding about the labour demand, the labour unions deciding about
the wages and the government choosing the tax rates and the public expen-
ditures. The labour supply exceeds the demand because of the wages set by
the labour unions. One result of the investigation is that if the unemploy-
ment benefits are low, then the level of provided public goods are increased
and the commodity taxes are decreased. Another conclusion is that if the
wage ratio between the two consumer types change, the labour input of the
consumer types react similarly.9
Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2004) base their research on a general equilibrium
model of a unionized economy. The agents are three consumer types i.e. the
owners of the firms and employed as well as unemployed workers, identical
firms, labour unions and a utilitarian government. The production only de-
pends on labour and the labour unions either decide only about the wage
rates or also about the number of working hours per worker. The paper
shows that in case the labour unions fix only the wages and in case the in-
come tax is unrestricted, the free market solution, including zero marginal
8Aronsson, Thomas, Lo¨fgren, Karl-Gustaf and Sjo¨gren, Tomas. Wage setting and
tax progressivity in dynamic general equilibrium. Oxford Economic Papers 54 (2002):
490-504.
9Aronsson, Thomas and Sjo¨gren, Tomas. Income Taxation, Commodity Taxation and
Provision of Public Goods under Labor Market Distortions. Finanzarchiv 59(3) (2003):
347-370.
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income tax, can be implemented. On the other hand if the income taxation
is restricted, there will be unemployment and a progressive labour income
tax. In the case of the labour unions choosing also the working hours there
is direct influence on the progressivity.10
Paulus and Peichl (2009) use the so called Euromod model, which is a
tax-benefit framework suitable for making comparative analysis for the EU
economies, to simulate the effects of flat tax reforms in Western Europe. The
Euromod model used by Paulus and Peichl makes it possible consistently to
compare the countries concerned. The authors come to the conclusion that
in certain situations a flat tax could increase income equality and encourages
people to work more. The real consequences however depend on the design
of the tax reform and what country is concerned. The simulated reforms
resemble the flat tax schemes in Eastern Europe.11
Dı´az-Gime´nez and Pijoan-Mas (2011) describe a modified neoclassical growth
model where the households are heterogeneous and cannot insure themselves
against idiosyncratic risks. The authors study the effects of various flat-tax
reforms on the distribution of income and the welfare of individuals in a
model economy. The model of Dı´az-Gime´nez and Pijoan-Mas use stochastic
aging and retirements to shape features connected to the life-cycle of indi-
viduals. The government in the model taxes capital income, labour income,
consumption and estates. The taxes are used for the benefits given to retired
households and for government consumption. According to the findings a
move towards a progressive consumption-based flat tax actually raises the
government income as the economy is stimulated. At the same time it sup-
ports the weakest people in the society.12
Aronsson and Wikstro¨m (2011) introduce a research based on Aronsson and
Sjo¨gren (2004) with the same agents of the model. In the paper of 2011
10Aronsson, Thomas and Sjo¨gren, Tomas. Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive
in a Unionized Economy?. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(4) (2004):661-675.
11Paulus, Alari and Peichl, Andreas. Effects of flat tax reforms in Western Europe.
Journal of Policy Modeling 31 (2009): 620-636.
12Dı´az-Gime´nez, Javier and Pijoan-Mas, Josep. Flat Tax Reforms: Investment Ex-
pensing and Progressivity. CEMFI Working Paper nr. 1101. (2011).
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the research is concentrating on how the progressivity of the labour income
taxation is impacted by whether the waging setting of the labour unions is
either centralized or decentralized. The utilitarian government now applies
two types of taxes, an unrestricted tax of profits and a progressive tax on
working income. The paper shows that with a decentralized wage setting,
the free market solution is attainable contrary to the centralization which
leads unemployment and a progressive taxation.13
Piketty et al. (2014) introduce a model for an optimal and a maximum
tax rate on working income. The authors develop optimality equations for
the maximal tax rates. The model of Piketty et al. considers three possible
responses to the tax policy. These responses are the supply-side, the tax-
avoidance and the compensation-bargaining response. The authors develop
optimality equations for the maximal tax rates. These equations depend on
the responses mentioned above. The conclusions are that the supply-side
response leads in theory to decreased tax rates being optimal for top earn-
ers as well as the others. The authors however, present some reasons why
this result in practice is problematic. In the case of tax-avoidance responses
the result is that high income individuals try to use the system in order to
avoid taxes. The authors suggest that these loopholes should be closed and
that top taxes can then be increased. Finally the compensation-bargaining
response encourages top earners to bargain for even higher income if their
taxes are lowered.14
Hummel and Jacobs (2016) analyze an economy that takes in consideration
workers, trade unions, owners of firms and the government. In the model the
labour market is unionized, workers face heterogeneous labour participation
costs and the wage rate depends on the type of work. Workers decide if they
want to take part in the labour market. Workers in different sectors belong
to different labour unions. The owners of the firms have a capital stock and
13Aronsson, Thomas and Wikstro¨m, Magnus. Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter
if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?. Department of Economics, Ume˚a
University. 2011.
14Piketty, Thomas, Saez, Emmanuel and Stantcheva, Stefanie. Optimal Taxation of
Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities. American Economic Journal 6, no. 1
(2014): 230-271.
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they hire different types of labour. The trade unions and the owners of the
firms negotiate about the wages. The conclusions are for instance that be-
cause labour unions often raise the wages above the market level the result
is involuntary unemployment and that the unionization of the labour market
decreases the optimal income taxation.15
In this paper I create a macroeconomic model, which can be used for calcu-
lating and estimating the effects of possible tax reforms for the individuals.
The model consists of heterogenous households, firms, a monopoly labour
union and a government. The households are of two types, those who own
the firms and those who work in the firms. The model is not based on any
specific existing model, although, I include features from certain macroeco-
nomic models introduced in existing papers. In practice this means that I
introduce a unique model to be used in the discussion about taxation in so-
ciety.
I start by describing the model in chapter 3. I present a general as well
as a specified description of the players involved. In chapter 4 I describe
the steady state of the model and in chapter 5 I make the welfare analysis
concerning the households. In the analysis I deal with a number of different
tax reform proposals and present the impacts of those. Finally in chapter 6
I draw conclusions of the results of my research.
3 The Model
The model consists of the government, the labour union, the firms and the
households and takes the form of a Stackelberg game. First the government
acts, followed by the labour union. Then the firms and the households act
simultaneously.
The model is solved backwards starting from the households and the firms,
followed by the labour union and ending with the government. In each step
15Hummel, Albert Jan and Jacobs, Bas. Optimal Income Taxation in Unionized Labor
Markets. Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute. (2016).
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when making the calculations, the optimality conditions of the previous steps
are treated as existing constraints.
3.1 General description of the agents
Two types of households are assumed to exist - those who work in the firms
(”workers”) and those who are the owners of the firms (”capitalists”). The
capitalists and firms are merged into one agent (”entrepreneur”) and are in-
separable from each other.
There is a finite number N of identical workers. They are either employed or
unemployed. An employed worker supplies one unit of labour each period.
A worker earns either a working income wt, paid by a firm or receives an un-
employment benefit Bt(wt) = αwt, paid by the government, where α ∈ (0,1).
The representative household decides how much to consume, Ct. The rest
of the wealth, i.e. the savings, Wt+1, is invested in one-period bonds issued
by the government. In the next period the representative household receives
from the government the value of the bonds including a periodic interest rate
rt+1, i.e. totally (1 + rt+1)Wt+1, i.e. the real interest rate in period t being
rt, where rt ∈ (−∞,∞). The consumption is taxed at the rate TC,t and
the labour income is taxed at the rate TLW,t, where TC,t, TLW,t ∈ (−∞, 1).
TLW,t includes the ordinary labour income tax as well as the social security
tax, paid by the worker. This labour tax is assumed to be deducted from
the income by the employing firm, which transfers the deducted sum to the
government.
The entrepreneurs are assumed to be identical and to own the capital stock.
Entrepreneurs produce a homogeneous final good using the production tech-
nology F (K,L), which exhibits constant returns-to-scale with regard to cap-
ital K and labour L. In every period t, the entrepreneurs make investment
decisions by choosing the next period’s capital stock Kt+1. Further, given the
gross wage wt of the worker in the period concerned, and the current period’s
capital stock Kt, entrepreneurs decide how much labour Lt to employ in pe-
riod t. The price for the final good is Pt, where Pt > 0. The investments are
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assumed to consist of the final good. The total profits of the entrepreneurs
are partly used for the investments and partly for consumption. As the dis-
crimination between the investments and the consumption of entrepreneurs
is incentive incompatible for the government, both are taxed as consumption,
i.e. at the rate TC,t. The investments are denoted by It. For simplicity, the
labour costs as well as the costs of investments are deducted from the gross
income of the entrepreneur. The remaining part of the gross income is taxed
at the rate Tpi,t, where Tpi,t ∈ (−∞, 1). The entrepreneurs’ net income is then
denoted by pit and is for simplicity in this paper called ”profit”.
The workers are represented by a monopoly labour union. The labour union
chooses the wage rate that maximizes the representative worker’s lifetime
utility, taking into consideration the worker’s budget constraint and the en-
trepreneur’s capital stock and labour demand decisions.
The government collects taxes and receives revenue by issuing bonds, the
amount being Dt+1 in period t. It uses the income to finance the public
expenditures Gt, the unemployment benefits Bt(wt) and the repayment of
old bond debts including the corresponding interest, i.e. (1 + rt)Dt. The tax
rates are exogenous and the public expenditures are determined through the
government’s budget constraint. The government’s budget is assumed to be
balanced.
3.2 Specified description of the agents
In order to solve the model, a more detailed description of the players is
needed.
3.2.1 Workers
The probability of a worker being employed is Lt
N
, where Lt is the total labour
demand and N is the total labour supply. The worker’s marginal disutility
of working is ψ > 0. The representative worker derives utility from his
consumption, Ct, and leisure time, N − Lt, i.e. the time he is not working.
The worker’s utility function is logarithmic and therefore the periodic utility
10
function of the representative worker in period t is
UW (Ct, Lt) = log(Ct) + ψlog(N − Lt). (1)
The lifetime utility of the representative worker is
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log(Ct) + ψlog(N − Lt)
)
, (2)
where β = 1
1+ρ
is the discount factor, ρ > 0 being the rate of time preference.
Based on the discussion in chapter 3.1, the budget constraint is
(1 + rt)Wt +
Lt
N
wt(1− TLW,t)N + (1− Lt
N
)αwt(1− TLW,t)N
= (1 + TC,t)PtCt +Wt+1,
(3)
or equivalently
Ct =
(1 + rt)Wt
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
Ltwt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
(N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
− Wt+1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
.
(4)
The worker’s utility maximization with respect to consumption is based on
dynamic programming. This is done in Appendix C.1.
Based on the calculations, the consumption path of the representative house-
hold is determined by the Euler equation
Ct+1
Ct
= β
Pt(1 + TC,t)
Pt+1(1 + TC,t+1)
(1 + rt+1). (5)
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
The representative entrepreneur derives utility from his profit, pit. The en-
trepreneur’s utility function is logarithmic and therefore the periodic utility
function of the representative entrepreneur in period t is
UE(pit) = log(pit). (6)
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The lifetime utility of the representative entrepreneur is
∞∑
t=0
( 1
1 + rt
)t
log(pit). (7)
The capital accumulation of the entrepreneurs can be described by the fol-
lowing equation:
Kt+1 −Kt = It − δKt, (8)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, assuming that δ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence
the invested amount equals the difference between next period’s amount of
capital and what is left of the current period’s capital after depreciation, i.e.
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt. (9)
The gross income of the representative entrepreneur, Yt, is defined as
Yt = PtF (Kt, Lt), (10)
which is the measurement for the Gross Domestic Product.
The total periodic profits of the entrepreneurs can therefore be expressed
as
pit = (1− Tpi,t)
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)PtIt
]
, (11)
which the representative entrepreneur considers to be his budget constraint.
In this model the production function F (Kt, Lt) is defined as
F (Kt, Lt) = A[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
σ
σ−1 , (12)
where η, σ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter η is distribution parameters, determining
the distribution of income between the factors of production. The parameter
σ measures the elasticity of factor substitution.
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The representative entrepreneur in period t chooses, as mentioned earlier,
next period’s capital stock Kt+1 and the labour demand in the current pe-
riod, Lt, in order to solve its maximization problem. The entrepreneur’s
maximization is based on dynamic programming, which is done in Appendix
C.2.
Based on the calculations, the representative entrepreneur’s optimal deci-
sion concerning the capital stock in the next period is determined by the
equation
(1− Tpi,t+1)Pt+1
(1 + rt+1)pit+1
[
FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) + (1 + TC,t+1)(1− δ)
]
=
(1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)Pt
pit
.
(13)
where the expression for FK(Kt, Lt) is given by equation (41) in the appendix.
Based on the calculations, the representative entrepreneur’s optimal deci-
sion concerning the labour demand in the current period is determined by
the equation
PtFL(Kt, Lt) = wt, (14)
where the expression for FL(Kt, Lt) is given by equation (48) in the appendix.
3.2.3 Labour union
The labour union maximizes the lifetime utility of the representative worker,
which is based on the workers’ periodic utility function given by equation (1),
with respect to the wage rate wt, subject to the workers’ budget constraint
(4), the capital stock decision and the labour demand of the representative
entrepreneur. The labour union’s maximization with respect to wt is solved
in Appendix C.3.
Based on the calculations, the labour union’s optimal decision concerning
the wage rate in the current period is determined by the equation[
Lt + (N − Lt)α
]
(1− TLW,t)(N − Lt)PtFLL(Kt, Lt)
+ (1− α)(N − Lt)wt(1− TLW,t) = ψ(1 + TC,t)PtCt.
(15)
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where the expression for FLL(Kt, Lt) is given by equation (54) in the ap-
pendix.
3.2.4 Government
The budget constraint for the government is
Tpi,t
{
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
[
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
]}
+ TC,tPt
(
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
+ TLW,twtLt
+Dt+1 = (1 + rt)Dt + PtGt + (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t),
(16)
where the expression for F (Kt, Lt) is given by equation (12).
The taxes, paid by the workers, are
TC,tPtCt and TLW,twtLt
The taxes, paid by the entrepreneurs, are
Tpi,t
{
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
[
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
]}
and TC,tPt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
The expenditures for the government are the public expenses PtGt and the
unemployment benefits (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t), paid to the workers.
3.2.5 The Bonds Market
It is assumed that the entrepreneurs do not issue bonds. Therefore the only
bonds issuer is the government, the amount being Dt+1 in period t. The only
agent buying bonds is the workers, the amount being Wt+1 in period t. The
bonds market in period t is characterized by the following equation:
Dt+1 = Wt+1. (17)
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3.2.6 The Goods Market
The model presented above fulfills Walras’ law. This is shown in appendix
B. The equilibrium of the goods market is
PtF (Kt, Lt) = PtCt + PtGt + pit + Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
. (18)
4 Description of the steady state
The model is examined in the steady state of the system (3), (5), (11), (13),
(14), (15) and (18). These steady state equations are developed in Appendix
D.1. Here the government’s budget equilibrium (16) is left out, referring
to Walras’ law. The endogenous variables are the capital stock and labour
demand of the entrepreneurs, the wage rate chosen by the monopoly labour
union, the consumption of the workers, the profit of the entrepreneurs and
finally the savings of the workers, i.e. {K∗, L∗, w∗, C∗, pi∗,W ∗}. The ex-
ogenous variables are the tax rates on labour, profit and consumption as
well as the ratio between government expenditures and the capital stock, i.e.
{T ∗LW , T ∗pi , T ∗C , G∗}.
5 Analysis
When considering different tax reform proposals, it is essential to examine
the possible effects. It is certainly important to try to foresee how the utility
of an individual is going to react to tax changes. This paper additionally
examines the effects on the workers’ consumption, the entrepreneurs’ profits,
the employment rate and the capital stock.
Calculations made in Appendices D.2 - D.3 are used in this chapter.
The utility of the representative worker increases with the worker’s consump-
tion and decreases with the labour demand of the entrepreneur as leisure time
15
gives the worker positive utility. Thus the following holds:
U∗W (C
∗, L∗), where
∂U∗W
∂C∗
> 0 and
∂U∗W
∂L∗
< 0. (19)
The utility of the representative entrepreneur increases with the entrepreneur’s
profit, i.e.
U∗E(pi
∗), where
∂U∗E
∂pi∗
> 0. (20)
5.1 Individual tax effects
The capital stock decision of the representative entrepreneur is described by
the following function:
K∗(T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C , G
∗), where
∂K∗
∂T ∗LW
< 0,
∂K∗
∂T ∗pi
< 0,
∂K∗
∂T ∗C
< 0,
∂K∗
∂G∗
> 0.
(21)
A higher tax on the worker’s labour income decreases the worker’s consump-
tion. Hence the entrepreneur decreases the production and thus also the
optimal capital stock is decreased.
An increase in the tax on the profit of the entrepreneur, diminishes the
incentives for the entrepreneur to produce as much final good as what was
optimal before the tax increase. Hence the target level of production will
decrease and thus there is no need for as big a capital stock as was the case
before the tax change, i.e. the optimal capital stock is decreased.
As mentioned in chapter 3.1, it is incentive incompatible to make a dis-
tinction between the investments and the private consumption of the en-
trepreneurs. Consequently, based on equation (9), also the investments are
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taxed as consumption. Increasing the tax rate on consumption will increase
the entrepreneur’s costs of investing in the capital stock. Hence an increased
consumption tax rate discourages the entrepreneur from making the optimal
investments and consequently the optimal capital stock decreases.
Higher government expenditures increases the demand for goods. Hence
the entrepreneur increases the production and thus also the optimal capital
stock is increased. However, the increase is very close to zero.
The labour demand decision of the representative entrepreneur is described
by the following function:
L∗(T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C , G
∗), where
∂L∗
∂T ∗LW
< 0,
∂L∗
∂T ∗pi
< 0,
∂L∗
∂T ∗C
< 0,
∂L∗
∂G∗
> 0.
(22)
Because the capital stock decision of the representative entrepreneur is nega-
tively affected by increased tax rates, the entrepreneur will decide to decrease
the demand for labour, i.e. less capital involved in the production process
results in a lower demand for labour. Higher government expenditures have
the opposite effect, however, to a very small extent.
The wage rate decision of the monopoly labour union is described by the
following function:
w∗(T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C , G
∗), where
∂w∗
∂T ∗LW
< 0,
∂w∗
∂T ∗pi
< 0,
∂w∗
∂T ∗C
< 0,
∂w∗
∂G∗
> 0.
(23)
When setting the wage rate, the labour union takes into consideration the
subsequent reactions of the entrepreneur. The higher the tax rates are, the
higher are the entrepreneur’s costs of employing workers. Therefore the union
will, in the presence of raised tax rates, decrease the wage rate in order to
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avoid increasing the pressure on the entrepreneur. Higher government ex-
penditures increase the labour demand and thus also the wages. However,
the increase is very close to zero.
The consumption of the representative worker is described by the following
function:
C∗(T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C , G
∗), where
∂C∗
∂T ∗LW
< 0,
∂C∗
∂T ∗pi
> 0,
∂C∗
∂T ∗C
< 0,
∂C∗
∂G∗
< 0.
(24)
Increased labour taxes negatively impact the labour demand and the wage
rate. Hence these tax increases diminish the possibility to consume.
Even though an increased profit tax results in decreased labour demand
and wages, the effect of an increased profit tax on the consumption of the
workers is positive. The reason is that the tax increase will result in a lower
entrepreneurs’ profit, which because of the equilibrium of the goods market
will actually increase the workers’ consumption.
An increased consumption tax has an indirect as well as a direct negative
effect on the worker’s consumption. The indirect effect is based on the neg-
ative effects on the labour demand and the wage rate. The direct effect is
based on the fact that an increased consumption tax increases the worker’s
consumption cost and hence discourages the worker from consuming.
Public spending crowds out the private consumption of workers, because
they both consist of the final good. Hence, it is intuitive that increased
government expenditures will negatively affect the representative worker’s
consumption.
The profit of the representative entrepreneur is described by the following
18
function:
pi∗(T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C , G
∗), where
∂pi∗
∂T ∗LW
< 0,
∂pi∗
∂T ∗pi
< 0,
∂pi∗
∂T ∗C
> 0,
∂pi∗
∂G∗
< 0.
(25)
Increased labour taxes as well as an increased profit tax negatively affect
the capital stock as well as the labour demand decision of the representative
entrepreneur. The production is based on the capital stock and the labour
demand. Therefore these tax increases negatively impact the level of pro-
duction. Hence the profit declines.
An increased consumption tax affects the entrepreneur’s profit in different
ways. On one hand, as the investments are taxed as consumption, an in-
creased consumption tax increases the costs of making investments. As a
result of this, the entrepreneur decides to invest less. Smaller investments
results in a bigger profit. On the other hand, an increased consumption tax,
as discussed earlier decreases the capital stock and labour demand of the
entrepreneur and consequently also the level of production. This means that
the profit decreases. Since the positive effect dominates, the total effect of
an increased consumption tax on the profit is positive.
Increased government expenditures affects the entrepreneur’s profit in differ-
ent ways. On one hand, increased expenditures, as discussed earlier slightly
increases the capital stock and labour demand of the entrepreneur and con-
sequently also the level of production. This means that the profit increases.
On the other hand, increased government expenditures crowd out the en-
trepreneurs’ profits in the goods market. Since the negative effect weakly
dominates, the total effect of increased government expenditures on the profit
is negative.
The gross income of the representative entrepreneur is described by the fol-
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lowing function:
Y ∗(T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C , G
∗), where
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗LW
< 0,
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗pi
< 0,
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗C
< 0,
∂Y ∗
∂G∗
> 0.
(26)
Because the capital stock decision as well as the labour demand decision of
the representative entrepreneur are negatively affected by increased tax rates,
the entrepreneurs’ gross income will decrease as a consequence of increased
taxes. Higher government expenditures have the opposite effect, however, to
a very small extent.
5.2 Tax reforms
The government’s budget should in every period be balanced. Consequently,
when a tax rate changes, other tax rates and/or the magnitude of the gov-
ernment expenditures must change in order to keep the budget balanced.
Based on the results presented in (21) - (25), it is possible by calibration
to find out what the effects of different tax reforms would be.
5.2.1 Tax reform: Shifting the taxation from labour to consump-
tion
In this reform, it is assumed that the profit taxation and the public expen-
ditures are kept constant. Thus when the labour taxation changes, the tax
rate on consumption must change in order to keep the government’s budget
balanced. The calculations needed for estimating the consequences for the
households can be found in Appendix D.3.1. The results of such a tax reform
are expressed by propositions 1 below.
Proposition 1 A transfer of taxation from labour to consumption
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• increases the representative worker’s utility
• increases the representative entrepreneur’s utility
• increases the representative worker’s consumption
• increases the representative entrepreneur’s profit
• increases the representative entrepreneur’s gross income
• decreases the wage rate
• increases the employment rate
• decreases the capital stock
• increases the ratio between the representative entrepreneur’s profit and
the value of the production
• decreases the ratio between the workers’ labour income and the value of
the production
This reform would generally be beneficial for the society. The wage rate, i.e.
the income of an employed worker, is the basis for the unemployment benefit
paid to an unemployed worker. Thus the decreased wage rate is negative for
the individual worker, employed or unemployed. As anyway the employment
rate increases, having a dominating role, the representative worker gains.
The underlying reason for this is that the labour taxation is distortional,
which effect is increased by the monopoly union’s decision making. Com-
pared to this, the consumption taxation is less distortional.
5.2.2 Tax reform: Shifting the taxation from profit to consump-
tion
In this reform, it is assumed that the labour taxation and the public expen-
ditures are kept constant. Thus when the profit taxation changes, the tax
rate on consumption must change in order to keep the government’s budget
balanced. The calculations needed for estimating the consequences for the
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households can be found in Appendix D.3.2. The results of such a tax reform
are expressed by propositions 2 below.
Proposition 2 A transfer of taxation from profit to consumption
• decreases the representative worker’s utility
• increases the representative entrepreneur’s utility
• decreases the representative worker’s consumption
• increases the representative entrepreneur’s profit
• increases the representative entrepreneur’s gross income slightly
• decreases the wage rate slightly
• increases the employment rate slightly
• decreases the capital stock
• increases the ratio between the representative entrepreneur’s profit and
the value of the production
• decreases the ratio between the workers’ labour income and the value of
the production slightly
This reform would hurt the workers and benefit the entrepreneurs. Also in
this case the decreased wage rate hurts the individual worker, employed or
unemployed. As the increase of the employment rate is close to zero, also
the representative worker loses. The underlying reason for this is that the
profit taxation has only an indirect effect on the worker, contrary to the con-
sumption taxation. For the entrepreneur the profit taxation is distortional
compared to the consumption taxation.
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6 Conclusions
This paper discusses possible consequences of certain tax reforms. The sys-
tem of taxation in the model introduced in this paper consists of taxation
on labour, profit and consumption. The effects are measured based on the
representative worker’s utility and consumption as well as the representative
entrepreneur’s utility, profit and gross income. Additionally the impacts on
the wage rate, the employment rate and the capital stock are examined. Fi-
nally the effects on the ratio between the representative entrepreneur’s profit
and the value of the production as well as the ratio between the workers’
labour income and the value of the production are investigated.
Keeping the government’s budget balanced, there are two main ways of
reforming of the tax system. One is based on the assumption of keeping
government expenditures constant and consequently keeping the total tax
burden unchanged, shifting the taxation between different types of taxes.
The other one includes changing the government expenditures, resulting in
a change of the total tax burden. This paper deals with reforms of the first
type.
As the government expenditures are not changed, the reforms dealt with
in this paper cover decreasing the labour or profit taxation and increasing
the consumption taxation. The detailed results of these reforms are pre-
sented in chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.
It is shown that the utility increases for workers as well as entrepreneurs
when decreasing labour taxes and increasing consumption taxes instead. The
effects on the workers’ consumption, entrepreneurs’ profits and gross income
as well as the employment rate are also positive. However, the reform would
lead to a decreased wage rate as well as a decreased capital stock. Despite the
decreased income of an individual worker, increased employment rate makes
the reform beneficial for the representative worker. The reason for these ef-
fects is that the labour taxation is distortional, which effect is increased by
the monopoly union’s decision making. Compared to this, the consumption
taxation is less distortional.
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It is shown that the utility decreases for workers and increases for the en-
trepreneurs when decreasing profit taxes and increasing consumption taxes
instead. The effects on the entrepreneurs’ profits and gross income are pos-
itive. However, the reform would lead to a decreased workers’ consumption
as well as a decreased capital stock. The effect on the wage rate is slightly
negative and in this case only slightly positive on the employment rate. The
reason for these effects is that the profit taxation has only an indirect effect
on the worker, contrary to the consumption taxation. For the entrepreneur
the profit taxation is distortional compared to the consumption taxation.
Both reforms shift the income share balance towards the entrepreneurs.
Summarizing the results, this paper shows that shifting to a more consumption-
based taxation has a number of positive effects.
24
A Summary of Parameters
Based on chapter 3, it holds that
α, η, σ ∈ (0, 1), ψ, ρ, Pt > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], rt ∈ (−∞,∞)
TLW,t, Tpi,t, TC,t ∈ (−∞, 1).
(27)
B Validity of Walras’ law
When checking if Walras’ law holds, one needs to consider the budget con-
straint of the workers, the profits of the entrepreneurs as well as the budget
constraint of the government.
The budget constraint of the workers, according to equation (3), is
(1 + rt)Wt + Ltwt(1− TLW,t) + (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t)
= (1 + TC,t)PtCt +Wt+1,
(28)
The profits of the entrepreneurs, based on equations (9) and (11), is
− pit + (1− Tpi,t)
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
= 0.
(29)
The budget constraint of the government, according to equation (16), is
Tpi,t
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
+ TC,tPt
(
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
+ TLW,twtLt
+Dt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt − PtGt − (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t) = 0.
(30)
Based on equation (17), equation (30) can be rewritten as
Tpi,t
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
+ TC,tPt
(
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
+ TLW,twtLt
+Wt+1 − (1 + rt)Wt − PtGt − (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t) = 0.
(31)
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Adding equations (28), (29) and (31) leads to
(1 + rt)Wt + Ltwt(1− TLW,t) + (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t)
+ Tpi,t
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
+ TC,tPt
(
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
+ TLW,twtLt
+Wt+1 − (1 + rt)Wt − PtGt − (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t)
− pit + (1− Tpi,t)
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
= (1 + TC,t)PtCt +Wt+1
⇔ −PtGt − pit + PtF (Kt, Lt)− Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
= PtCt
⇔ PtF (Kt, Lt) = PtCt + PtGt + pit + Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
, (32)
which describes the general goods market balance outside the steady state.
C Solving the Model
Based on the description in chapter 3, the model is now solved step-by-step.
C.1 Workers
The state variables in period t are TLW,t, TC,t, rt, Wt and wt. Based on (2)
and (4), the maximization problem becomes
Vt = V(TLW,t, TC,t, rt,Wt, wt) = max
Wt+1
{
log(Ct) + ψlog(N − Lt)
+ βV(TLW,t+1, TC,t+1, rt+1,Wt+1, wt+1)
}
,
where Ct =
(1 + rt)Wt
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
Ltwt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
(N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
− Wt+1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
(33)
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with β = 1
1+ρ
being the discount factor and ρ the rate of time preference.
Maximization with respect to Wt+1 leads to
1
Ct
× (− 1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
) + β
∂Vt+1
∂Wt+1
= 0. (34)
Based on the first-order condition (34), the saved assets for period t+1 are
dependent on the saved assets for period t, i.e. the saved assets for period
t+1 can be expressed as the decision rule Wt+1(Wt). Now the value func-
tion (33) is differentiated with respect to Wt, keeping the savings function
Wt+1(Wt) in mind.
∂Vt
∂Wt
=
1
Ct
[
1 + rt
Pt(1 + TC,t)
− 1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
∂Wt+1
∂Wt
]
+ β
∂Vt+1
∂Wt+1
∂Wt+1
∂Wt
=
1
Ct
× 1 + rt
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
[
1
Ct
× (− 1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
) + β
∂Vt+1
∂Wt+1
]
∂Wt+1
∂Wt
⇔ ∂Vt
∂Wt
=
1
Ct
× 1 + rt
Pt(1 + TC,t)
. (35)
Forwarding equation (35) by one period generates
∂Vt+1
∂Wt+1
=
1
Ct+1
× 1 + rt+1
Pt+1(1 + TC,t+1)
and substituting the received equation into the first-order condition (34) leads
to
1
Ct
× (− 1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
) + β
1
Ct+1
× 1 + rt+1
Pt+1(1 + TC,t+1)
= 0
⇔ 1
Ct
× 1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
= β
1
Ct+1
× 1 + rt+1
Pt+1(1 + TC,t+1)
⇔ Ct+1
Ct
= β
Pt(1 + TC,t)
Pt+1(1 + TC,t+1)
(1 + rt+1). (36)
Equation (36) is the Euler equation for the representative worker.
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C.2 Entrepreneurs
The state variables in period t are Tpi,t, TC,t, Kt and wt. Based on (7) and
(11), the maximization problem takes the following form:
Vt,f = V(Tpi,t, TC,t, Kt, wt) =
max
Kt+1,Lt
{
log(pit) +
1
1 + rt+1
V(Tpi,t+1, TC,t+1, Kt+1, wt+1)
}
,
where pit = (1− Tpi,t)
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
.
(37)
The production function F (Kt, Lt) is expressed by formula (12).
Maximization with respect to Kt+1 now generates
− (1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)Pt
pit
+
1
1 + rt+1
∂Vt+1,f
∂Kt+1
= 0. (38)
Based on the first-order condition (38), the capital stock in period t+1 is
dependent on the capital stock in period t, i.e. the capital stock in period
t+1 can be expressed as the decision rule Kt+1(Kt). Now the value function
(37) is differentiated with respect to Kt, keeping the decision rule in mind.
∂Vt,f
∂Kt
=
(1− Tpi,t)
pit
[
Pt
∂F (Kt, Lt)
∂Kt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
∂Kt+1
∂Kt
− 1 + δ
)]
+
1
1 + rt+1
∂Vt+1,f
∂Kt+1
∂Kt+1
∂Kt
=
(1− Tpi,t)Pt
pit
[
FK(Kt, Lt) + (1 + TC,t)(1− δ)
]
+
[
− (1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)Pt
pit
+
1
1 + rt+1
∂Vt+1,f
∂Kt+1
]
∂Kt+1
∂Kt
⇔ ∂Vt,f
∂Kt
=
(1− Tpi,t)Pt
pit
[
FK(Kt, Lt) + (1 + TC,t)(1− δ)
]
. (39)
Forwarding equation (39) by one period generates
⇔ ∂Vt+1,f
∂Kt+1
=
(1− Tpi,t+1)Pt+1
pit+1
[
FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) + (1 + TC,t+1)(1− δ)
]
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and substituting the received equation into the first-order condition (38) leads
to
− (1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)Pt
pit
+
1
1 + rt+1
× (1− Tpi,t+1)Pt+1
pit+1
× [FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) + (1 + TC,t+1)(1− δ)] = 0. (40)
Based on production function (12), the expression for FK(Kt, Lt) in equation
(40) is received from the following calculation:
FK(Kt, Lt) = A
σ
σ − 1[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1η
σ − 1
σ
K
− 1
σ
t
⇔ FK(Kt, Lt) = Aη[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1K
− 1
σ
t . (41)
Now totally differentiating equation (40) with respect to Kt+1, Kt, wt, Pt,
Tpi,t and TC,t, considering equation (11), generates
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{
− (1− Tpi,t)
2(1 + TC,t)
2P 2t
pi2t
− (1− Tpi,t+1)
2P 2t+1
(1 + rt+1)pi2t+1
× [FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) + (1 + TC,t+1)(1− δ)]2
+
(1− Tpi,t+1)Pt+1FKK(Kt+1, Lt+1)
(1 + rt+1)pit+1
}
dKt+1
+
[
(1− Tpi,t)2(1 + TC,t)P 2t
pi2t
(
FK(Kt, Lt) + (1 + TC,t)(1− δ)
)]
dKt
− (1− Tpi,t)
2(1 + TC,t)Pt(1 + TLE,t)Lt
pi2t
dwt[
− (1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)
pit
+
(1− Tpi,t)2(1 + TC,t)Pt
pi2t
× [F (Kt, Lt)− (1 + TC,t)(Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt)]]dPt
+
[
(1 + TC,t)Pt
pit
− (1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)Pt
pi2t
× [PtF (Kt, Lt)− (1 + TLE,t)wtLt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]]
dTpi,t +
[
− (1− Tpi,t)Pt
pit
− (1− Tpi,t)
2(1 + TC,t)P
2
t
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
pi2t
]
dTC,t = 0.
(42)
Based on equation (42), the capital choice of the representative entrepreneur
can be expressed as
Kt+1(Kt, wt, Pt, Tpi,t, TC,t) (43)
Based on equation (41), the expression for FKK(Kt, Lt) in equation (42)
can be received from the following calculation:
FKK(Kt, Lt) = Aη
1
σ − 1[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
2−σ
σ−1η
σ − 1
σ
K
− 1
σ
t K
− 1
σ
t
+ Aη[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1 (− 1
σ
)K
−σ+1
σ
t
⇔ FKK(Kt, Lt) = Aη
2
σ
[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
2−σ
σ−1K
− 2
σ
t
− Aη
σ
[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1K
−σ+1
σ
t
(44)
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Regarding the optimal labour demand, i.e. the labour demand Lt that max-
imizes the value function specified in (37), it holds that
Lt = arg max
Lt
{
log(pit) +
1
1 + rt+1
V(Tpi,t+1, TC,t+1, Kt+1, wt+1)
}
= arg max
Lt
log(pit) = arg max
Lt
pit.
Consequently the maximization problem (37) can now be rewritten as
max
Lt
{
(1− Tpi,t)
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]}
.
(45)
Maximization of (37) with respect to Lt generates:
(1− Tpi,t)
(
Pt
∂F (Kt, Lt)
∂Lt
− wt
)
= 0
⇔ (1− Tpi,t)
(
PtFL(Kt, Lt)− wt
)
= 0, (46)
which, based on (27), can be rewritten as
PtFL(Kt, Lt)− wt = 0. (47)
Based on production function (12), the expression for FL(Kt, Lt) in equa-
tion (47) is received from the following calculation:
FL(Kt, Lt) = A
σ
σ − 1[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1 (1− η)σ − 1
σ
L
− 1
σ
t
⇔ FL(Kt, Lt) = A(1− η)[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1L
− 1
σ
t . (48)
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Differentiating totally equation (47) with respect to Lt, Kt, wt and Pt gen-
erates
PtFLL(Kt, Lt)dLt + PtFLK(Kt, Lt)dKt − dwt + FL(Kt, Lt)dPt = 0. (49)
With dwt = dPt = 0, equation (49) can be rewritten as
∂Lt
∂Kt
= −FLK(Kt, Lt)
FLL(Kt, Lt)
. (50)
With dKt = dPt = 0, equation (49) can be rewritten as
∂Lt
∂wt
=
1
PtFLL(Kt, Lt)
. (51)
With dKt = dwt = 0, equation (49) can be rewritten as
∂Lt
∂Pt
= − FL(Kt, Lt)
PtFLL(Kt, Lt)
. (52)
Based on equations (50) - (52), the labour demand of the representative
entrepreneur can be expressed as
Lt(Kt, wt, Pt) (53)
Based on equation (48), the expression for FLL(Kt, Lt) in equations (49)
- (??) can be received from the following calculation:
FLL(Kt, Lt) = A(1− η) 1
σ − 1[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
2−σ
σ−1 (1− η)
× σ − 1
σ
L
− 1
σ
t L
− 1
σ
t + A(1− η)[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1 (− 1
σ
)L
−σ+1
σ
t
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⇔ FLL(Kt, Lt) = A(1− η)
2
σ
[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
2−σ
σ−1L
− 2
σ
t
− A(1− η)
σ
[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
1
σ−1L
−σ+1
σ
t .
(54)
Based on equation (48), the expression for FLK(Kt, Lt) in equation (50) can
be received from the following calculation:
FLK(Kt, Lt) = A(1− η) 1
σ − 1[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
2−σ
σ−1η
σ − 1
σ
K
− 1
σ
t L
− 1
σ
t
⇔ FLK(Kt, Lt) = A(1− η)η
σ
[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
2−σ
σ−1K
− 1
σ
t L
− 1
σ
t . (55)
C.3 Labour union
The state variables in period t are TLW,t, TC,t, rt and Wt. Based on (2) and
(4), the maximization problem becomes
Vt,U = V(TLW,t, TC,t, rt,Wt) = max
wt
{
log(Ct) + ψlog(N − Lt)
+ βV(TLW,t+1, TC,t+1, rt+1,Wt+1, wt+1)
}
,
where Ct =
(1 + rt)Wt
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
Ltwt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
(N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
− Wt+1
Pt(1 + TC,t)
,
(56)
with β = 1
1+ρ
being the discount factor and ρ the rate of time preference.
Maximization with respect to wt, taking into consideration equation (51),
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leads to
1
Ct
[(
Lt + (N − Lt)α
)
(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
∂Lt
∂wt
× (1− α)wt(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
]
− ψ 1
N − Lt
∂Lt
∂wt
= 0
⇔ 1
Ct
[(
Lt + (N − Lt)α
)
(1− TLW,t)
Pt(1 + TC,t)
+
(1− α)wt(1− TLW,t)
P 2t FLL(Kt, Lt)(1 + TC,t)
]
− ψ 1
(N − Lt)PtFLL(Kt, Lt) = 0
⇔ (Lt + (N − Lt)α)(1− TLW,t)(N − Lt)PtFLL(Kt, Lt)
+ (1− α)(N − Lt)wt(1− TLW,t)− ψ(1 + TC,t)PtCt = 0.
(57)
D Comparative statics
The comparative statistics analysis will here be done by first collecting the
steady state equations, representing the optimal choices of individuals, firms
and the union, and then applying Cramer’s rule on the received system of
equations.
The production function F (Kt, Lt) is assumed to be approximated using
a 2nd degree Taylor approximation polynomial:
F (Kt, Lt) ≈
F (K∗, L∗) + FK(K∗, L∗)(Kt −K∗) + FL(K∗, L∗)(Lt − L∗)
+
1
2
[
FKK(K
∗, L∗)(Kt −K∗)2 + FKL(K∗, L∗)(Lt − L∗)2
+ FLK(K
∗, L∗)(Kt −K∗)2 + FLL(K∗, L∗)(Lt − L∗)2
]
.
(58)
This shows that any 3rd or higher degree derivative of the production func-
tion must equal zero.
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D.1 Steady state equations
In this section, the following budget constraints and optimality conditions
will be transformed into their steady state counterparts: (3), (5), (11), (13),
(14) and (15). In steady state all tax rates, being exogenous variables, will
be constant.
Based on equation (3), the steady state budget for the representative worker
is expressed by
(1 + r∗)W ∗ + L∗w∗(1− T ∗LW ) + (N − L∗)αw∗(1− T ∗LW )
= (1 + T ∗C)P
∗C∗ +W ∗
⇔ r∗W ∗ + L∗w∗(1− T ∗LW ) + (N − L∗)αw∗(1− T ∗LW )
− (1 + T ∗C)P ∗C∗ = 0.
(59)
Applying steady state values to the Euler equation for the representative
worker, i.e. equation (5) and taking in consideration that β = 1
1+ρ
the fol-
lowing calculation is received
C∗
C∗
= β
P ∗(1 + T ∗C)
P ∗(1 + T ∗C)
(1 + r∗)⇔ 1 = 1
1 + ρ
(1 + r∗)
⇔ ρ = r∗, (60)
which expresses the equilibrium steady state interest rate.
Based on equation (11), the steady state profit for the representative en-
trepreneur can be received from the following calculation, taking in consid-
eration equations (9) and (12):
pit = (1− Tpi,t)
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
⇔ pit = (1− Tpi,t)
[
PtA[ηK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− η)L
σ−1
σ
t ]
σ
σ−1 − wtLt
− (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
⇔ pi∗ = (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗A[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1
− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗
(
K∗ − (1− δ)K∗)]
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⇔ −pi∗ + (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗A[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1
− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
= 0.
(61)
The entrepreneur’s optimality condition for the capital stock (13) in steady
state is, taking in consideration (27) and (41), reached by the calculation
below:
− (1− Tpi,t)(1 + TC,t)Pt
pit
+
1
1 + rt+1
× (1− Tpi,t+1)Pt+1
pit+1
×
[
FK(Kt+1, Lt+1) + (1 + TC,t+1)(1− δ)
]
= 0
⇔ −(1− T
∗
pi )(1 + T
∗
C)P
∗
pi∗
+
1
1 + r∗
× (1− T
∗
pi )P
∗
pi∗
×
[
FK(K
∗, L∗) + (1 + T ∗C)(1− δ)
]
= 0
⇔ −(1 + r∗)(1 + T ∗C) + FK(K∗, L∗) + (1 + T ∗C)(1− δ) = 0
⇔ FK(K∗, L∗)− (1 + T ∗C)(1 + r∗ − 1 + δ) = 0
⇔ Aη[η(K∗)σ−1σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (K∗)− 1σ
− (1 + T ∗C)
(
r∗ + δ
)
= 0.
(62)
The entrepreneur’s optimality condition for the labour demand (14) in steady
state is, taking in consideration equation (48), reached by the calculation be-
low
P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)− w∗ = 0
⇔ P ∗A(1− η)[η(K∗)σ−1σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (L∗)− 1σ − w∗ = 0. (63)
The labour union’s optimality condition for the wage rate (15) in steady
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state is, taking in consideration equations (54), reached by the calculation
below (
L∗ + (N − L∗)α)(1− T ∗LW )(N − L∗)P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
+ (1− α)(N − L∗)w∗(1− T ∗LW )− ψ(1 + T ∗C)P ∗C∗ = 0
⇔ (L∗ + (N − L∗)α)(1− T ∗LW )(N − L∗)P ∗
×
(
A
(1− η)2
σ
[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 2−σσ−1 (L∗)− 2σ
− A(1− η)
σ
[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (L∗)−σ+1σ
)
+ (1− α)(N − L∗)w∗(1− T ∗LW )− ψ(1 + T ∗C)P ∗C∗ = 0.
(64)
In the steady state it holds that the goods market is balanced. This means
that the steady state production F (K∗, L∗) equals the sum of the repre-
sentative worker’s consumption C∗, the government expenditures G∗, the
representative entrepreneur’s net profit pi∗ and the steady state investments
I∗ including the adjustment costs. Consequently, based on equation (18) and
taking in consideration equations (9) and (12), it holds that
P ∗F (K∗, L∗) = P ∗C∗ + P ∗G∗ + pi∗ + P ∗
(
K∗ − (1− δ)K∗)
⇔ P ∗A[η(K∗)σ−1σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 − P ∗C∗
− P ∗G∗ − pi∗ − P ∗δK∗ = 0.
(65)
Based on the equations (59) - (65), the following system of steady state
equations is received:
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
ρW ∗ + L∗w∗(1− T ∗LW ) + (N − L∗)αw∗(1− T ∗LW )− (1 + T ∗C)P ∗C∗ = 0 .= f 1
−pi∗ + (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗A[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1
−w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
= 0
.
= f 2
Aη[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (K∗)− 1σ − (1 + T ∗C)
(
ρ+ δ
)
= 0
.
= f 3
P ∗A(1− η)[η(K∗)σ−1σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (L∗)− 1σ − w∗ = 0 .= f 4(
L∗ + (N − L∗)α)(1− T ∗LW )(N − L∗)P ∗
×
(
A (1−η)
2
σ
[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 2−σσ−1 (L∗)− 2σ
−A (1−η)
σ
[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (L∗)−σ+1σ
)
+(1− α)(N − L∗)w∗(1− T ∗LW )− ψ(1 + T ∗C)P ∗C∗ = 0 .= f 5
P ∗A
[
η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 − P ∗C∗ − P ∗G∗ − pi∗ − P ∗δK∗ = 0 .= f 6
where the endogenous variables K∗, L∗, w∗, C∗, pi∗ and W ∗ form the fol-
lowing vector
EN =

K∗
L∗
w∗
C∗
pi∗
W ∗

and where the exogenous variables T ∗LW , T
∗
pi , T
∗
C and G
∗ form the following
vector
EX =

T ∗LW
T ∗pi
T ∗C
G∗
 .
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D.2 Application of Cramer’s rule
The system of equations expressed in the previous section is now used in
order to apply Cramer’s rule, i.e.
f 1K f
1
L f
1
w f
1
C f
1
pi f
1
W
f 2K f
2
L f
2
w f
2
C f
2
pi f
2
W
f 3K f
3
L f
3
w f
3
C f
3
pi f
3
W
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w f
4
C f
4
pi f
4
W
f 5K f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C f
5
pi f
5
W
f 6K f
6
L f
6
w f
6
C f
6
pi f
6
W


dK∗
dL∗
dw∗
dC∗
dpi∗
dW ∗

+

f 1TLW f
1
Tpi
f 1TC f
1
G
f 2TLW f
2
Tpi
f 2TC f
2
G
f 3TLW f
3
Tpi
f 3TC f
3
G
f 4TLW f
4
Tpi
f 4TC f
4
G
f 5TLW f
5
Tpi
f 5TC f
5
G
f 6TLW f
6
Tpi
f 6TC f
6
G


dT ∗LW
dT ∗pi
dT ∗C
dG∗
 = 0
For an endogenous variable X∗, the Cramer’s rule will generate the following
equation:
dX∗ = −|DX,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|DX,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|DX,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|DX,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where X∗ ∈ {K∗, L∗, w∗, C∗, pi∗,W ∗}.
(66)
D.2.1 Derivatives
In order to be able to apply Cramer’s rule, the equations f 1 - f 6 of the equa-
tion system are differentiated with respect to all the endogenous as well as
the exogenous variables.
Differentiating f 1 with respect to K∗ generates
f 1K =
∂f 1
∂K∗
= 0. (67)
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Differentiating f 1 with respect to L∗ generates
f 1L =
∂f 1
∂L∗
= (1− α)w∗(1− T ∗LW ). (68)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to w∗ generates
f 1w =
∂f 1
∂w∗
=
(
L∗ + (N − L∗)α)(1− T ∗LW ). (69)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to C∗ generates
f 1C =
∂f 1
∂C∗
= −(1 + T ∗C)P ∗. (70)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to pi∗ generates
f 1pi =
∂f 1
∂pi∗
= 0. (71)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to W ∗ generates
f 1W =
∂f 1
∂W ∗
= ρ. (72)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to T ∗LW generates
f 1TLW =
∂f 1
∂T ∗LW
= −(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)w∗. (73)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to T ∗pi generates
f 1Tpi =
∂f 1
∂T ∗pi
= 0. (74)
Differentiating f 1 with respect to T ∗C generates
f 1TC =
∂f 1
∂T ∗C
= −P ∗C∗. (75)
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Differentiating f 1 with respect to G∗ generates
f 1G =
∂f 1
∂G∗
= 0. (76)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to K∗, taking into consideration equation
(41), generates
f 2K =
∂f 2
∂K∗
= (1− T ∗pi )
(
P ∗FK(K∗, L∗)− (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δ
)
which, based on equation f 3 in the steady state equation system above, can
be rewritten as
f 2K = (1− T ∗pi )P ∗(1 + T ∗C)ρ. (77)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to L∗, taking into consideration equation (48),
generates
f 2L =
∂f 2
∂L∗
= (1− T ∗pi )
(
P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)− w∗
)
which, based on equation f 4 in the steady state equation system above, can
be rewritten as
f 2L = 0. (78)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to w∗ generates
f 2w =
∂f 2
∂w∗
= −(1− T ∗pi )L∗. (79)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to C∗ generates
f 2C =
∂f 2
∂C∗
= 0. (80)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to pi∗ generates
f 2pi =
∂f 2
∂pi∗
= −1. (81)
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Differentiating f 2 with respect to W ∗ generates
f 2W =
∂f 2
∂W ∗
= 0. (82)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to T ∗LW generates
f 2TLW =
∂f 2
∂T ∗LW
= 0. (83)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to T ∗pi , taking into consideration equation (12),
generates
f 2Tpi =
∂f 2
∂T ∗pi
= −P ∗F (K∗, L∗) + w∗L∗ + (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗. (84)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to T ∗C generates
f 2TC =
∂f 2
∂T ∗C
= −(1− T ∗pi )P ∗δK∗. (85)
Differentiating f 2 with respect to G∗ generates
f 2G =
∂f 2
∂G∗
= 0. (86)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to K∗, taking into consideration equation
(44), generates
f 3K =
∂f 3
∂K∗
= FKK(K
∗, L∗). (87)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to L∗, taking into consideration equation (55),
generates
f 3L =
∂f 3
∂L∗
= FLK(K
∗, L∗). (88)
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Differentiating f 3 with respect to w∗ generates
f 3w =
∂f 3
∂w∗
= 0. (89)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to C∗ generates
f 3C =
∂f 3
∂C∗
= 0. (90)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to pi∗ generates
f 3pi =
∂f 3
∂pi∗
= 0. (91)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to W ∗ generates
f 3W =
∂f 3
∂W ∗
= 0. (92)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to T ∗LW generates
f 3TLW =
∂f 3
∂T ∗LW
= 0. (93)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to T ∗pi generates
f 3Tpi =
∂f 3
∂T ∗pi
= 0. (94)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to T ∗C generates
f 3TC =
∂f 3
∂T ∗C
= −(ρ+ δ). (95)
Differentiating f 3 with respect to G∗ generates
f 3G =
∂f 3
∂G∗
= 0. (96)
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Differentiating f 4 with respect to K∗, taking into consideration equation
(55), generates
f 4K =
∂f 4
∂K∗
= P ∗FLK(K∗, L∗). (97)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to L∗, taking into consideration (54), gener-
ates
f 4L =
∂f 4
∂L∗
= P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗). (98)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to w∗ generates
f 4w =
∂f 4
∂w∗
= −1. (99)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to C∗ generates
f 4C =
∂f 4
∂C∗
= 0. (100)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to pi∗ generates
f 4pi =
∂f 4
∂pi∗
= 0. (101)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to W ∗ generates
f 4W =
∂f 4
∂W ∗
= 0. (102)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to T ∗LW generates
f 4TLW =
∂f 4
∂T ∗LW
= 0. (103)
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Differentiating f 4 with respect to T ∗pi generates
f 4Tpi =
∂f 4
∂T ∗pi
= 0. (104)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to T ∗C generates
f 4TC =
∂f 4
∂T ∗C
= 0. (105)
Differentiating f 4 with respect to G∗ generates
f 4G =
∂f 4
∂G∗
= 0. (106)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to K∗, considering equations (54) and (58),
generates
f 5K =
∂f 5
∂K∗
= 0. (107)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to L∗, considering equations (54), (58), gen-
erates
f 5L =
∂f 5
∂L∗
=
(
(1− α)(N − L∗)− (L∗ + (N − L∗)α))
× (1− T ∗LW )P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)− (1− α)w∗(1− T ∗LW ).
(108)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to w∗ generates
f 5w =
∂f 5
∂w∗
= (1− α)(N − L∗)(1− T ∗LW ). (109)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to C∗ generates
f 5C =
∂f 5
∂C∗
= −ψ(1 + T ∗C)P ∗. (110)
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Differentiating f 5 with respect to pi∗ generates
f 5pi =
∂f 5
∂pi∗
= 0. (111)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to W ∗ generates
f 5W =
∂f 5
∂W ∗
= 0. (112)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to T ∗LW , considering equations (54), generates
f 5TLW =
∂f 5
∂T ∗LW
= −(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)(N − L∗)P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
− (1− α)(N − L∗)w∗.
(113)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to T ∗pi generates
f 5Tpi =
∂f 5
∂T ∗pi
= 0. (114)
Differentiating with respect to T ∗C generates
f 5TC =
∂f 5
∂T ∗C
= −ψP ∗C∗. (115)
Differentiating f 5 with respect to G∗ generates
f 5G =
∂f 5
∂G∗
= 0. (116)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to K∗, taking into consideration equation
(41), generates
f 6K =
∂f 6
∂K∗
= P ∗FK(K∗, L∗)− P ∗δ. (117)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to L∗, taking into consideration equation (48),
generates
f 6L =
∂f 6
∂L∗
= P ∗FL(K∗, L∗),
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which, based on equation f 4 in the steady state equation system above, can
be rewritten as
f 6L = w
∗. (118)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to w∗ generates
f 6w =
∂f 6
∂w∗
= 0. (119)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to C∗ generates
f 6C =
∂f 6
∂C∗
= −P ∗. (120)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to pi∗ generates
f 6pi =
∂f 6
∂pi∗
= −1. (121)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to W ∗ generates
f 6W =
∂f 6
∂W ∗
= 0. (122)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to T ∗LW generates
f 6TLW =
∂f 6
∂T ∗LW
= 0. (123)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to T ∗pi generates
f 6Tpi =
∂f 6
∂T ∗pi
= 0. (124)
Differentiating f 6 with respect to T ∗C generates
f 6TC =
∂f 6
∂T ∗C
= 0. (125)
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Differentiating f 6 with respect to G∗ generates
f 6G =
∂f 6
∂G∗
= −P ∗. (126)
D.2.2 Determinants
Based on the theory about the application of Cramer’s rule and the equations
(67) - (126), the required determinants can now be calculated.
|D| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
f 6K f
6
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
0 f 5L f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |D| = ρf 5Cf 4w
(
f 3Kf
6
L − f 6Kf 3L
)
+ ρf 6C
(
− f 4wf 3Kf 5L + f 5w(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L)
)
+ ρf 5C
(
f 2w(f
3
Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L) + f 4wf 2Kf 3L
)
.
(127)
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|DK,TLW | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 1TLW f
1
L f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
0 0 f 2w 0 −1 0
0 f 3L 0 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0 0
f 5TLW f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 2w 0 −1
0 f 3L 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0
f 5TLW f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C 0
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 3L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
f 5TLW f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 2w 0
0 f 3L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
f 5TLW f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 3L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
0 f 6L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 3L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
f 5TLW f
5
L f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 2w
0 f 3L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DK,TLW | = ρf 6Cf 5TLW f 3Lf 4w. (128)
|DK,Tpi | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2Tpi 0 f
2
w 0 −1 0
0 f 3L 0 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2Tpi 0 f
2
w 0 −1
0 f 3L 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C 0
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 3L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2Tpi 0 f
2
w 0
0 f 3L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2Tpi 0 f
2
w
0 f 3L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DK,Tpi | = ρf 5Cf 2Tpif 3Lf 4w. (129)
|DK,TC | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 1TC f
1
L f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2TC 0 f
2
w 0 −1 0
f 3TC f
3
L 0 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0 0
f 5TC f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2TC 0 f
2
w 0 −1
f 3TC f
3
L 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0
f 5TC f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C 0
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3TC f
3
L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
f 5TC f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C
0 f 6L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2TC 0 f
2
w 0
f 3TC f
3
L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
f 5TC f
5
L f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3TC f
3
L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
0 f 6L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3TC f
3
L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
f 5TC f
5
L f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2TC 0 f
2
w
f 3TC f
3
L 0
0 f 4L f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DK,TC | = ρf 5Cf 3TCf 6Lf 4w + ρf 6C
(
f 3TC (f
4
Lf
5
w − f 5Lf 4w) + f 5TCf 3Lf 4w
)
+ ρf 5C
(
f 2TCf
3
Lf
4
w + f
3
TC
f 4Lf
2
w
)
.
(130)
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|DK,G| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
0 0 f 2w 0 −1 0
0 f 3L 0 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
f 6G f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 2w 0 −1
0 f 3L 0 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C 0
f 6G f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 3L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
f 6G f
6
L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 2w 0
0 f 3L 0 0
0 f 4L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
6
G
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3L 0 0
f 4L f
4
w 0
f 5L f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DK,G| = −ρf 6Gf 5Cf 3Lf 4w. (131)
|DL,TLW | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1TLW f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1 0
f 3K 0 0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5TLW f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1
f 3K 0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5TLW f
5
w f
5
C 0
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 f 5TLW f
5
w f
5
C
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0
f 3K 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 f 5TLW f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρf
3
K
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 4w 0
f 5TLW f
5
w f
5
C
0 0 f 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w
f 3K 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DL,TLW | = −ρf 3Kf 6Cf 5TLW f 4w. (132)
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|DL,Tpi | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 1w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K f
2
Tpi
f 2w 0 −1 0
f 3K 0 0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C 0 0
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K f
2
Tpi
f 2w 0 −1
f 3K 0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C 0
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K f
2
Tpi
f 2w 0
f 3K 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K f
2
Tpi
f 2w
f 3K 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DL,Tpi | = −ρf 5Cf 2Tpif 3Kf 4w. (133)
|DL,TC | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1TC f
1
w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K f
2
TC
f 2w 0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
TC
0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5TC f
5
w f
5
C 0 0
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K f
2
TC
f 2w 0 −1
f 3K f
3
TC
0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5TC f
5
w f
5
C 0
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
TC
0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 f 5TC f
5
w f
5
C
f 6K 0 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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+ ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K f
2
TC
f 2w 0
f 3K f
3
TC
0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 f 5TC f
5
w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
TC
0
f 4K 0 f
4
w
f 6K 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
TC
0
f 4K 0 f
4
w
0 f 5TC f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K f
2
TC
f 2w
f 3K f
3
TC
0
f 4K 0 f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DL,TC | = −ρf 5Cf 3TCf 6Kf 4w + ρf 6C
(− f 4wf 3Kf 5TC − f 5wf 4Kf 3TC)
+ ρf 5C
(− f 2wf 4Kf 3TC + f 4w(f 2Kf 3TC − f 3Kf 2TC )). (134)
|DL,G| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 f 1w f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1 0
f 3K 0 0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C 0 0
f 6K f
6
G 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1
f 3K 0 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C 0
f 6K f
6
G 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C
f 6K f
6
G 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0
f 3K 0 0 0
f 4K 0 f
4
w 0
0 0 f 5w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρf
6
G
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K 0 0
f 4K f
4
w 0
0 f 5w f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DL,G| = ρf 6Gf 5Cf 3Kf 4w. (135)
|Dw,TLW | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
TLW
f 1C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 0 0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TLW
f 5C 0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 0 0 −1
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TLW
f 5C 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TLW
f 5C
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 0 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TLW
f 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L 0
f 6K f
6
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L 0
0 f 5L f
5
TLW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 0
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |Dw,TLW | = ρf 6Cf 5TLW (f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L). (136)
|Dw,Tpi | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L 0 f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
Tpi
0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C 0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
Tpi
0 −1
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
Tpi
0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
Tpi
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |Dw,Tpi | = ρf 5Cf 2Tpi(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L). (137)
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|Dw,TC | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
TC
f 1C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
TC
0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TC
f 5C 0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
TC
0 −1
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TC
f 5C 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TC
f 5C
f 6K f
6
L 0 f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
TC
0
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
TC
f 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
f 4K f
4
L 0
f 6K f
6
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
f 4K f
4
L 0
0 f 5L f
5
TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρf 5C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
TC
f 3K f
3
L f
3
TC
f 4K f
4
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |Dw,TC | = −ρf 5Cf 3TC (f 4Kf 6L − f 6Kf 4L)
+ ρf 6C
(
f 3TCf
4
Kf
5
L + f
5
TC
(f 3Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L)
)
+ ρf 5C
(
f 2TC (f
3
Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L)− f 3TCf 2Kf 4L
)
.
(138)
|Dw,G| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L 0 f
1
C 0 ρ
f 2K 0 0 0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C 0 0
f 6K f
6
L f
6
G f
6
C −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 0 0 −1
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C 0
f 6K f
6
L f
6
G f
6
C −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C
f 6K f
6
L f
6
G f
6
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 0 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L 0 0
0 f 5L 0 f
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L 0
f 6K f
6
L f
6
G
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 6C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L 0
0 f 5L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |Dw,G| = −ρf 5Cf 6G(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L). (139)
|DC,TLW | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
w f
1
TLW
0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TLW
0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0 −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0 −1
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TLW
0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TLW
f 6K f
6
L 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TLW
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
5
TLW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
f 6K f
6
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 5TLE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DC,TLW | = ρf 5TLW f 4w
(
f 3Kf
6
L − f 6Kf 3L
)
+ ρf 5TLW f
2
w
(
f 3Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L
)
+ ρf 5TLW f
4
wf
2
Kf
3
L.
(140)
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|DC,Tpi | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
w 0 0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
w f
2
Tpi
−1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w 0 0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0 −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w f
2
Tpi
−1
f 3K f
3
L 0 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w 0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w f
2
Tpi
f 3K f
3
L 0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
2
Tpi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
0 f 5L f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⇔ |DC,Tpi | = −ρf 2Tpi
(− f 4wf 3Kf 5L + f 5w(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L)). (141)
|DC,TC | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 f 1L f
1
w f
1
TC
0 ρ
f 2K 0 f
2
w f
2
TC
−1 0
f 3K f
3
L 0 f
3
TC
0 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TC
0 0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0 −1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w f
2
TC
−1
f 3K f
3
L 0 f
3
TC
0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TC
0
f 6K f
6
L 0 0 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0 f
3
TC
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TC
f 6K f
6
L 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ρ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w f
2
TC
f 3K f
3
L 0 f
3
TC
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w 0
0 f 5L f
5
w f
5
TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = −ρf
3
TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
0 f 5L f
5
w
f 6K f
6
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −ρf 5TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
f 6K f
6
L 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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−ρf 2TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
0 f 5L f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 3TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
0 f 5L f
5
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +ρf 5TC
∣∣∣∣∣∣
f 2K 0 f
2
w
f 3K f
3
L 0
f 4K f
4
L f
4
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ρf 3TC
(
− f 4wf 6Kf 5L − f 5w
(
f 4Kf
6
L − f 6Kf 4L
))
+ ρf 5TCf
4
w
(
f 3Kf
6
L − f 6Kf 3L
)
− ρf 2TC
(
− f 4wf 3Kf 5L + f 5w
(
f 3Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L
))
+ ρf 3TC
(
f 2K
(
f 4Lf
5
w − f 5Lf 4w
)
+ f 2wf
4
Kf
5
L
)
+ ρf 5TC
(
f 2w
(
f 3Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L
)
+ f 4wf
2
Kf
3
L
)
= −ρf 3TC
(
f 6K
(
f 4Lf
5
w − f 4wf 5L
)− f 5wf 4Kf 6L)
− ρf 2TC
(
− f 4wf 3Kf 5L + f 5w(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L)
)
+ ρf 3TC
(
f 2K
(
f 4Lf
5
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⇔ |DC,G| = ρf 6G
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⇔ |DW,TC | = f 1Cf 3TC
(
− f 4wf 6Kf 5L − f 5w
(
f 4Kf
6
L − f 6Kf 4L
))
− (f 1Cf 5TC − f 5Cf 1TC)f 4w(f 3Kf 6L − f 6Kf 3L)
+ f 5Cf
3
TC
(
f 1w
(
f 4Kf
6
L − f 6Kf 4L
)
+ f 4wf
6
Kf
1
L
)
+
(
f 6Cf
1
TC
+ f 1Cf
2
TC
)(− f 4wf 3Kf 5L + f 5w(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L))
+ f 6Cf
3
TC
f 4K
(
f 1Lf
5
w − f 5Lf 1w
)
− (f 6Cf 5TC + f 5Cf 2TC)(f 1w(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L)− f 4wf 3Kf 1L)
− f 1Cf 3TC
(
f 2K
(
f 4Lf
5
w − f 5Lf 4w
)
+ f 2wf
4
Kf
5
L
)
− (f 1Cf 5TC − f 5Cf 1TC)(f 2w(f 3Kf 4L − f 4Kf 3L)+ f 4wf 2Kf 3L)
+ f 5Cf
3
TC
(
− f 2K
(
f 1Lf
4
w − f 4Lf 1w
)
+ f 4Kf
1
Lf
2
w
)
.
(150)
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⇔ |DW,G| = −f 1Cf 6G
(
− f 4wf 3Kf 5L + f 5w
(
f 3Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L
))
+ f 5Cf
6
G
(
f 1w
(
f 3Kf
4
L − f 4Kf 3L
)− f 4wf 3Kf 1L). (151)
D.2.3 Calibration values
Certain parameters and endogenous variables are to be calibrated. These are
listed in tables 1 and 2 below.
Calibration of endogenous variables, the period length being one year:
Table 1: Variable values
Variable Description Value Unit
G∗ public expenditures 1.19221 ×1011 EUR
K∗ firm capital stock 2.61 ×1011 EUR
w∗ gross wage rate 39822 EUR
L∗ entrepreneurs’ labour demand 2447250 persons
N workers’ labour supply 2682250 persons
The values reported in table 1 are based on data from Statistics Finland16.
16Statistics Finland. https://www.stat.fi/index_en.html. Accessed: February
2018.
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Calibration of parameters:
Table 2: Parameter values
Parameter Description Value
ρ rate of time preference 0.0638
δ depreciation rate 0.05
σ factor elasticity 0.6735
η income share of capital 0.423
α ratio between unemployment benefits and wage rate 0.5
TLW worker’s labour tax 0.3
Tpi profit tax rate 0.2
TC consumption tax rate 0.24
The values for parameters ρ, δ, σ and η, reported in table 2 are based on
sources from the literature17. The value for α is based on data from Statis-
tics Finland18 and The Federation of Unemployment Funds in Finland19. The
values for the tax rates TLW , Tpi and TC are based on information from the
Taxpayers Association of Finland20 and the Finnish Tax Administration21,22.
Based on the system of equations discussed in chapter D.1 and the values
reported in tables 1 and 2, the following calibrations are done:
17Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco; Ngo, Van Long and Poschke, Markus. Capital Labor
Substitution, Structural Change, and the Labor Income Share. CIRANO - Scientific
Publications 2014 nr 2. 2014.
18Statistics Finland, ibid.
19The Federation of Unemployment Funds in Finland. http://www.tyj.fi/eng/
earnings-related_allowance/allowance_calculator/. Accessed: February 2018.
20Taxpayers Association of Finland.
https://www.veronmaksajat.fi/Vieraskieliset-sivut/
Taxpayers-Association-of-Finland-TAF/.
Value based on table published in https://www.veronmaksajat.fi/luvut/Laskelmat/
Palkansaajan-veroprosentit/. Accessed: February 2018.
21Finnish Tax Administration.
https://www.vero.fi/en/businesses-and-corporations/about-corporate-taxes/
income_taxation/. Accessed: February 2018.
22Finnish Tax Administration.
https://www.vero.fi/en/businesses-and-corporations/about-corporate-taxes/
vat/. Accessed: February 2018.
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Table 3: Calibrated values
Symbol Description Value Unit
A production level parameter 1823260.741 1
P price level 0.007082512 EUR
pi entrepreneurs’ profits 117047708.7 EUR
C workers’ consumption 1.36479 ×1013 EUR
W workers’ wealth/savings 7.57746 ×1011 EUR
ψ worker’s dis-utility of working 0.027099415 1
D.2.4 Connections between some derivatives and variables
In addition to the results in the chapter above, below follows some calcula-
tions in order to develop further tools, needed for the determinants.
First of all, since the production function is assumed to be concave, it is
known that
FK(K
∗, L∗) > 0, FL(K∗, L∗) > 0,
FKK(K
∗, L∗) < 0, FLL(K∗, L∗) < 0,
FLK(K
∗, L∗) > 0, FKL(K∗, L∗) > 0.
(152)
Based on equation (48), equation f 4 in the equation system in chapter D.1
can be rewritten as
FL(K
∗, L∗) =
w∗
P ∗
. (153)
Based on equation (41) and equation f 3 in the system of equations presented
in appendix D.1, it holds that
FK(K
∗, L∗) = (1 + T ∗C)(ρ+ δ). (154)
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Based on equations (12), (41) and (48), it holds that
FK(K
∗, L∗)K∗
F (K∗, L∗)
+
FL(K
∗, L∗)L∗
F (K∗, L∗)
=
Aη[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (K∗)− 1σK∗
A[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1
+
A(1− η)[η(K∗)σ−1σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 (L∗)− 1σL∗
A[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1
=
[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] 1σ−1 [η(K∗)σ−1σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ]
[η(K∗)
σ−1
σ + (1− η)(L∗)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 = 1
⇔ FK(K
∗, L∗)K∗
F (K∗, L∗)
+
FL(K
∗, L∗)L∗
F (K∗, L∗)
= 1. (155)
Now, based on equation f 2 in the equation system in appendix D.1 and
equations (12), (153), (154) and (155), it holds that
pi∗ = (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
⇔ pi∗ = (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗
(
FK(K
∗, L∗)K∗ + FL(K∗, L∗)L∗
)
− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
⇔ pi∗ = (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗
(
(1 + T ∗C)(ρ+ δ)K
∗ +
w∗L∗
P ∗
)
− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
⇔ pi∗ = (1− T ∗pi )
[
P ∗(1 + T ∗C)(ρ+ δ)K
∗ + w∗L∗
− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
⇔ pi∗ = (1− T ∗pi )P ∗(1 + T ∗C)ρK∗. (156)
D.2.5 Cramer’s rule calibrated
Applying Cramer’s rule, expressed by equation (66), while considering equa-
tions (67) - (151) and the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and 3, gives the
following equations:
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dK∗ = −|DK,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|DK,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|DK,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|DK,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where − |DK,TLW ||D| = −32630733980, −
|DK,Tpi |
|D| = −34573593.07,
− |DK,TC ||D| = −1.60582× 10
11, −|DK,G||D| = 0.001673628.
(157)
dL∗ = −|DL,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|DL,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|DL,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|DL,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where − |DL,TLW ||D| = −305960.0143, −
|DL,Tpi |
|D| = −324.1771097,
− |DL,TC ||D| = −172914.4443, −
|DL,G|
|D| = 1.56927× 10
−8.
(158)
dw∗ = −|Dw,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|Dw,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|Dw,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|Dw,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where − |Dw,TLW ||D| = −1.64163× 10
−11,
− |Dw,Tpi ||D| = −1.73937× 10
−14, −|Dw,TC ||D| = −85.98158256,
− |Dw,G||D| = 8.41989× 10
−25.
(159)
dC∗ = −|DC,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|DC,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|DC,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|DC,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where − |DC,TLW ||D| = −1.72119× 10
12, −|DC,Tpi ||D| = 18834198077,
− |DC,TC ||D| = −9.90022× 10
11, −|DC,G||D| = −0.911720131.
(160)
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dpi∗ = −|Dpi,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|Dpi,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|Dpi,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|Dpi,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where − |Dpi,TLW ||D| = −14633535.04, −
|Dpi,Tpi |
|D| = −146325140.7,
− |Dpi,TC ||D| = 22379010.74, −
|Dpi,G|
|D| = −7.50553× 10
−7.
(161)
dW ∗ = −|DW,TLW ||D| dT
∗
LW −
|DW,Tpi |
|D| dT
∗
pi −
|DW,TC |
|D| dT
∗
C −
|DW,G|
|D| dG
∗,
where − |DW,TLW ||D| = 1.43008× 10
12, −|DW,Tpi ||D| = 2662176340,
− |DW,TC ||D| = 1.41832× 10
12, −|DW,G||D| = −0.128869822.
(162)
D.3 Welfare analysis
In preparation for the welfare analysis, it is necessary to develop the steady
state version of the government’s budget constraint (16). Taking into con-
sideration equation (17), this is done in the following calculation:
Tpi,t
[
PtF (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − (1 + TC,t)Pt
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)]
+ TC,tPt
(
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
)
+ TLW,twtLt
+Dt+1 − (1 + rt)Dt − PtGt − (N − Lt)αwt(1− TLW,t) = 0
⇔ T ∗pi
[
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗
(
K∗ − (1− δ)K∗)]
+ T ∗CP
∗(C∗ +K∗ − (1− δ)K∗)+ T ∗LWw∗L∗
+D∗ − (1 + r∗)D∗ − P ∗G∗ − (N − L∗)αw∗(1− T ∗LW ) = 0
⇔ T ∗pi
[
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
+ T ∗CP
∗(C∗ + δK∗)
+ T ∗LWw
∗L∗ − r∗D∗ − P ∗G∗ − (N − L∗)αw∗(1− T ∗LW ) = 0.
(163)
Equation (163) expresses the steady state version of the government’s budget
constraint.
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Totally differentiating the steady state budget (163) with regards to T ∗LW ,
T ∗pi , T
∗
C and G
∗ generates:
w∗
(
L∗ + (N − L∗)α)dT ∗LW
+
[
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
]
dT ∗pi
+
(− T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗))dT ∗C − P ∗dG∗ = 0.
(164)
Based on equation (164), the connection between changes in different taxa-
tion and public expenditure parameters can be calculated.
In order to be able to analyse how the utility of workers change in steady
state as a consequence of tax rate changes, the utility function (1) must first
be expressed in steady state terms. Substituting steady state values into (1)
gives
U∗W
.
= UW (C
∗, L∗) = log(C∗) + ψlog(N − L∗). (165)
Totally differentiating equation (165) with regard to U∗W , C
∗ and L∗, gener-
ates
dU∗W =
1
C∗
dC∗ − ψ
N − L∗dL
∗. (166)
In order to be able to analyse how the utility of entrepreneurs change in
steady state as a consequence of tax rate changes, the utility function (6)
must first be expressed in steady state terms. Substituting steady state val-
ues into (6) gives
U∗E
.
= UE(pi
∗) = log(pi∗). (167)
Totally differentiating equation (167) with regard to U∗E and pi
∗, generates
dU∗E =
1
pi∗
dpi∗. (168)
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Now, based on the above calculations, it is possible to assess the different
welfare effects of tax reform proposals. In order to do that
Based on equation (166) and values mentioned in the tables 1 and 2, it
holds that
∂U∗W
∂C∗
> 0 and
∂U∗W
∂L∗
< 0. (169)
Based on equation (168) and values mentioned in the tables 1 and 2, it
holds that
∂U∗E
∂pi∗
> 0. (170)
Further it is possible to investigate the effects of different tax reforms for
instance on the workers’ consumption, the entrepreneurs’ profits, the wage
rate, the employment rate being defined as E∗ = L
∗
N
and the capital stock.
Additionally, the tax effects on the ratio between the entrepreneurs’ profits
and the value of the production as well as on the ratio between the workers’
labour income and the value of the production can be examined. In order to
do that some calculations are necessary to conduct.
Totally differentiating equation f 3 in the equation system of chapter D.1
with regard to A, K∗, L∗ and T ∗C , keeping in mind equations (41), (44), (55),
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(157) and (158), leads to
FK(K
∗, L∗)
A
dA+ FKK(K
∗, L∗)dK∗ + FLK(K∗, L∗)dL∗ − (ρ+ δ)dT ∗C = 0
⇔ FK(K
∗, L∗)
A
dA+
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TLW ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,TLW |
|D|
)
dT ∗LW
+
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,Tpi ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,Tpi |
|D|
)
dT ∗pi
+
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TC ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,TC |
|D| − (ρ+ δ)
)
dT ∗C
+
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,G||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,G|
|D|
)
dG∗ = 0
⇔ dA = − A
FK(K∗, L∗)
×
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TLW ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,TLW |
|D|
)
dT ∗LW
− A
FK(K∗, L∗)
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,Tpi ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,Tpi |
|D|
)
dT ∗pi
− A
FK(K∗, L∗)
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TC ||D|
− FLK(K∗, L∗) |DL,TC ||D| − (ρ+ δ)
)
dT ∗C
− A
FK(K∗, L∗)
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,G||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,G|
|D|
)
dG∗.
(171)
Totally differentiating the steady state version of equation (12) with regard
to F (K∗, L∗), A, K∗ and L∗, taking into consideration equations (41), (48),
(157), (158) and (171), leads to
dF (K∗, L∗) =
F (K∗, L∗)
A
dA+ FK(K
∗, L∗)dK∗ + FL(K∗, L∗)dL∗
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⇔ dF (K∗, L∗) =
[
− F (K
∗, L∗)
FK(K∗, L∗)
×
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TLW ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,TLW |
|D|
)
− FK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TLW ||D| − FL(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,TLW |
|D|
]
dT ∗LW
+
[
− F (K
∗, L∗)
FK(K∗, L∗)
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,Tpi ||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,Tpi |
|D|
)
− FK(K∗, L∗) |DK,Tpi ||D| − FL(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,Tpi |
|D|
]
dT ∗pi
+
[
− F (K
∗, L∗)
FK(K∗, L∗)
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TC ||D|
− FLK(K∗, L∗) |DL,TC ||D| − (ρ+ δ)
)
− FK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TC ||D|
− FL(K∗, L∗) |DL,TC ||D|
]
dT ∗C
+
[
− F (K
∗, L∗)
FK(K∗, L∗)
(
− FKK(K∗, L∗) |DK,G||D| − FLK(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,G|
|D|
)
− FK(K∗, L∗) |DK,G||D| − FL(K
∗, L∗)
|DL,G|
|D|
]
dG∗.
(172)
Totally differentiating equation f 4 in the equation system of chapter D.1
with regard to P ∗, K∗, L∗, A and w∗, keeping in mind equations (48), (54),
(55), (157), (158), (159) and (171), leads to
FL(K
∗, L∗)dP ∗ + P ∗FLK(K∗, L∗)dK∗ + P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)dL∗
+ P ∗
FL(K
∗, L∗)
A
dA− dw∗ = 0
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⇔ FL(K∗, L∗)dP ∗ +
(
− P ∗FLK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TLW ||D| − P
∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,TLW |
|D|
+ P ∗
FL(K
∗, L∗)
A
∂A
∂T ∗LW
+
|Dw,TLW |
|D|
)
dT ∗LW
+
(
− P ∗FLK(K∗, L∗) |DK,Tpi ||D| − P
∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,Tpi |
|D|
+ P ∗
FL(K
∗, L∗)
A
∂A
∂T ∗pi
+
|Dw,Tpi |
|D|
)
dT ∗pi
+
(
− P ∗FLK(K∗, L∗) |DK,TC ||D| − P
∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,TC |
|D|
+ P ∗
FL(K
∗, L∗)
A
∂A
∂T ∗C
+
|Dw,TC |
|D|
)
dT ∗C
+
(
− P ∗FLK(K∗, L∗) |DK,G||D| − P
∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,G|
|D|
+ P ∗
FL(K
∗, L∗)
A
∂A
∂G∗
+
|Dw,G|
|D|
)
dG∗ = 0
⇔ dP ∗ = −
(
− P
∗FLK(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DK,TLW |
|D|
− P
∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,TLW |
|D| +
P ∗
A
∂A
∂T ∗LW
+
1
FL(K∗, L∗)
|Dw,TLW |
|D|
)
dT ∗LW
−
(
− P
∗FLK(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DK,Tpi |
|D| −
P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,Tpi |
|D|
+
P ∗
A
∂A
∂T ∗pi
+
1
FL(K∗, L∗)
|Dw,Tpi |
|D|
)
dT ∗pi
−
(
− P
∗FLK(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DK,TC |
|D| −
P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,TC |
|D|
+
P ∗
A
∂A
∂T ∗C
+
1
FL(K∗, L∗)
|Dw,TC |
|D|
)
dT ∗C
−
(
− P
∗FLK(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DK,G|
|D| −
P ∗FLL(K∗, L∗)
FL(K∗, L∗)
|DL,G|
|D|
+
P ∗
A
∂A
∂G∗
+
1
FL(K∗, L∗)
|Dw,G|
|D|
)
dG∗
(173)
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The ratio between the entrepreneurs’ profits and the value of the produc-
tion is defined as
pi∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
.
= Ω∗pi (174)
Totally differentiating equation (174) with regard to Ω∗pi, pi
∗, P ∗ and F (K∗, L∗),
keeping in mind equations (12), (161), (172) and (173), leads to
dΩ∗pi =
1
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
dpi∗ − pi
∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2dP ∗ − pi∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2dF (K∗, L∗)
⇔ dΩ∗pi =
(
− 1
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dpi,TLW |
|D| −
pi∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂T ∗LW
− pi
∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂T ∗LW
)
dT ∗LW
+
(
− 1
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dpi,Tpi |
|D| −
pi∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂T ∗pi
− pi
∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂T ∗pi
)
dT ∗pi
+
(
− 1
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dpi,TC |
|D| −
pi∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂T ∗C
− pi
∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂T ∗C
)
dT ∗C
+
(
− 1
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dpi,G|
|D| −
pi∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂G∗
− pi
∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂G∗
)
dG∗.
(175)
The ratio between the workers’ labour income and the value of the pro-
duction is defined as
L∗w∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
.
= Ω∗Lw (176)
78
Totally differentiating equation (176) with regard to Ω∗Lw, L
∗, w∗, P ∗ and
F (K∗, L∗), keeping in mind equations (12), (48), (158), (159), (172) and
(173), leads to
dΩ∗Lw =
(
w∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
− L
∗w∗P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 )dL∗ + L∗P ∗F (K∗, L∗)dw∗
− L
∗w∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2dP ∗ − L∗w∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2dF (K∗, L∗)
⇔ dΩ∗Lw =
[
−
(
w∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
− L
∗w∗P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ) |DL,TLW ||D|
− L
∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dw,TLW |
|D| −
L∗w∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂T ∗LW
− L
∗w∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂T ∗LW
]
dT ∗LW
+
[
−
(
w∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
− L
∗w∗P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ) |DL,Tpi ||D|
− L
∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dw,Tpi |
|D| −
L∗w∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂T ∗pi
− L
∗w∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂T ∗pi
]
dT ∗pi
+
[
−
(
w∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
− L
∗w∗P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ) |DL,TC ||D|
− L
∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dw,TC |
|D| −
L∗w∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂T ∗C
− L
∗w∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂T ∗C
]
dT ∗C
+
[
−
(
w∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
− L
∗w∗P ∗FL(K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ) |DL,G||D|
− L
∗
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
|Dw,G|
|D| −
L∗w∗F (K∗, L∗)(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂P ∗∂G∗
− L
∗w∗P ∗(
P ∗F (K∗, L∗)
)2 ∂F (K∗, L∗)∂G∗
]
dG∗.
(177)
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Based on the calculations above, the effect of tax reforms on the gross income
of the entrepreneur can be investigated. The gross income, as expressed in
equation (11), is
P ∗F (K∗, L∗) .= Y ∗. (178)
Totally differentiating equation (178) with regard to Y ∗, P ∗ and F (K∗, L∗),
keeping in mind equations (172) and (173), leads to
dY ∗ = F (K∗, L∗)dP ∗ + P ∗dF (K∗, L∗)
⇔ dY ∗ =
(
F (K∗, L∗)
∂P ∗
∂T ∗Lw
+ P ∗
∂F (K∗, L∗)
∂T ∗Lw
)
dT ∗Lw
+
(
F (K∗, L∗)
∂P ∗
∂T ∗pi
+ P ∗
∂F (K∗, L∗)
∂T ∗pi
)
dT ∗pi
+
(
F (K∗, L∗)
∂P ∗
∂T ∗C
+ P ∗
∂F (K∗, L∗)
∂T ∗C
)
dT ∗C
+
(
F (K∗, L∗)
∂P ∗
∂G∗
+ P ∗
∂F (K∗, L∗)
∂G∗
)
dG∗.
(179)
D.3.1 Tax reform: Shifting the taxation from labour to consump-
tion
Assume that the profit taxation and the public expenditures are kept con-
stant. Thus when the worker’s labour taxation changes, the tax rate on
consumption must change in order to keep the government’s budget balanced.
Based on equations (164) and (165), the effect of this reform proposal on
the utility of a worker can be estimated. The change in the worker’s labour
taxation has a direct effect on the utility as well as an indirect effect, gener-
ated by the change in consumption taxation. The total effect on the utility
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is
∂U∗W
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂U∗W
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂U∗W
∂T ∗C
=
1
C∗
∂C∗
∂T ∗LW
− ψ
N − L∗
∂L∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
(
1
C∗
∂C∗
∂T ∗C
− ψ
N − L∗
∂L∗
∂T ∗C
)
.
(180)
Based on equations (158), (160) and on the values mentioned in tables 1,
2 and 3, equation (180) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate is de-
creased by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax
rate, the worker’s utility increases.
Correspondingly, regarding the entrepreneurs, the total effect on the util-
ity, based on equations (164) and (167), is
∂U∗E
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂U∗E
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂U∗E
∂T ∗C
=
1
pi∗
∂pi∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
1
pi∗
∂pi∗
∂T ∗C
.
(181)
Based on equation (161) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (181) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
entrepreneur’s utility increases.
The effect on the workers’ consumption is:
∂C∗
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂C∗
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂C∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂C∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂C∗
∂T ∗C
.
(182)
81
Based on equation (160) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (182) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
workers’ consumption increases with 0.050 per cent.
The effect on the entrepreneurs’ profit is:
∂pi∗
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂pi∗
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂pi∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂pi∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂pi∗
∂T ∗C
.
(183)
Based on equation (161) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (183) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
entrepreneurs’ profit increases with 0.327 per cent.
The effect on the wage rate is:
∂w∗
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂w∗
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂w∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂w∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂w∗
∂T ∗C
.
(184)
Based on equation (159) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (184) is positive. If the worker’s labour tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
wage rate decreases with 0.002 per cent.
The effect on the employment rate is:
∂E∗
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂E∗
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂E∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂E∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂E∗
∂T ∗C
.
(185)
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Based on equation (158) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (185) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
employment rate increases with 0.050 per cent.
The effect on the capital stock is:
∂K∗
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂K∗
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂K∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂K∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂K∗
∂T ∗C
.
(186)
Based on equation (157) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (186) is positive. If the worker’s labour tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
capital stock decreases with 0.525 per cent.
The effect on the ratio between the entrepreneurs’ profits and the value of
the production is:
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗C
=
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗C
.
(187)
Based on equations (161), (172), (173), (175) and on the values mentioned in
tables 1, 2 and 3, equation (187) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate
is decreased by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption
tax rate, the ratio between the entrepreneurs’ profits and the value of the
production increases with 0.278 per cent.
The effect on the ratio between the workers’ labour income and the value
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of the production is:
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗C
=
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗C
.
(188)
Based on equations (158), (159), (172), (173), (177) and on the values men-
tioned in tables 1, 2 and 3, equation (188) is positive. If the worker’s labour
tax rate is decreased by one percentage point, leading to an increased con-
sumption tax rate, the ratio between the workers’ labour income and the
value of the production decreases with 0.051 per cent.
The effect on the gross income of the entrepreneur is:
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗LW
|
dT ∗pi=dG∗=0
=
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗LW
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗LW
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗LW
− w
∗(L∗ + (N − L∗)α)
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗C
.
(189)
Based on equations (172), (173), (179) and on the values mentioned in tables
1, 2 and 3, equation (189) is negative. If the worker’s labour tax rate is
decreased by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax
rate, the gross income of the entrepreneur increases with 0.049 per cent.
Based on the above results, proposition 1 in chapter 5.2.1 holds.
D.3.2 Tax reform: Shifting the taxation from profit to consump-
tion
Assume that the labour taxation and the public expenditures are kept con-
stant. Thus when the profit taxation changes, the tax rate on consumption
must change in order to keep the government’s budget balanced.
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Based on equations (164) and (165), the effect of this reform proposal on
the utility of a worker can be estimated. The change in the profit taxation
has a direct effect on the utility as well as an indirect effect, generated by
the change in consumption taxation. The total effect on the utility is
∂U∗W
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂U∗W
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂U∗W
∂T ∗C
=
1
C∗
∂C∗
∂T ∗pi
− ψ
N − L∗
∂L∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
×
(
1
C∗
∂C∗
∂T ∗C
− ψ
N − L∗
∂L∗
∂T ∗C
)
.
(190)
Based on equations (158), (160) and on the values mentioned in tables 1,
2 and 3, equation (190) is positive. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one
percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the worker’s
utility decreases.
Correspondingly, regarding the entrepreneurs, the total effect on the util-
ity, based on equations (164) and (167), is
∂U∗E
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂U∗E
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂U∗E
∂T ∗C
=
1
pi∗
∂pi∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× 1
pi∗
∂pi∗
∂T ∗C
.
(191)
Based on equation (161) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and 3,
equation (191) is negative. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one percent-
age point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the entrepreneur’s
utility increases.
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The effect on the workers’ consumption is:
∂C∗
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂C∗
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂C∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂C∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂C
∗
∂T ∗C
.
(192)
Based on equation (160) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (192) is positive. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one per-
centage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the workers’
consumption decreases with 0.001 per cent.
The effect on the entrepreneurs’ profit is:
∂pi∗
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂pi∗
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂pi∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂pi∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂pi
∗
∂T ∗C
.
(193)
Based on equation (161) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and 3,
equation (193) is negative. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one percent-
age point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the entrepreneurs’
profit increases with 1.250 per cent.
The effect on the wage rate is:
∂w∗
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂w∗
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂w∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂w∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂w
∗
∂T ∗C
.
(194)
Based on equation (159) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (194) is positive. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one per-
centage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the wage rate
decreases with 3.266 ×10−6 per cent.
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The effect on the employment rate is:
∂E∗
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂E∗
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂E∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂E∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂E
∗
∂T ∗C
.
(195)
Based on equation (158) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (195) is negative. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one per-
centage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the employment
rate increases with 2.560 ×10−5 per cent.
The effect on the capital stock is:
∂K∗
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂K∗
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂K∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂K∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂K
∗
∂T ∗C
.
(196)
Based on equation (157) and on the values mentioned in tables 1, 2 and
3, equation (196) is positive. If the profit tax rate is decreased by one per-
centage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the capital stock
decreases with 0.001 per cent.
The effect on the ratio between the entrepreneurs’ profits and the value of
the production is:
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗C
=
∂Ω∗pi
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂Ω
∗
pi
∂T ∗C
.
(197)
Based on equations (161), (172), (173), (175) and on the values mentioned
in tables 1, 2 and 3, equation (197) is negative. If the profit tax rate is
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decreased by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax
rate, the ratio between the entrepreneurs’ profits and the value of the pro-
duction increases with 1.250 per cent.
The effect on the ratio between the workers’ labour income and the value
of the production is:
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗C
=
∂Ω∗Lw
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂Ω
∗
Lw
∂T ∗C
.
(198)
Based on equations (158), (159), (172), (173), (177) and on the values men-
tioned in tables 1, 2 and 3, equation (198) is positive. If the profit tax rate
is decreased by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption
tax rate, the ratio between the workers’ labour income and the value of the
production decreases with 2.660 ×10−5 per cent.
The effect on the gross income of the entrepreneur is:
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗pi
|
dT ∗LW=dG∗=0
=
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗pi
+
∂T ∗C
∂T ∗pi
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗C
=
∂Y ∗
∂T ∗pi
− P
∗F (K∗, L∗)− w∗L∗ − (1 + T ∗C)P ∗δK∗
−T ∗piP ∗δK∗ + P ∗(C∗ + δK∗)
× ∂Y
∗
∂T ∗C
.
(199)
Based on equations (172), (173), (179) and on the values mentioned in tables
1, 2 and 3, equation (199) is negative. If the profit tax rate is decreased
by one percentage point, leading to an increased consumption tax rate, the
gross income of the entrepreneur increases with 2.340 ×10−5 per cent.
Based on the above results, proposition 2 in chapter 5.2.2 holds.
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